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INTRODUCTION
On December 10, 2013, then-Mayor Michael Bloomberg of New
York City announced the largest continuous free outdoor public WiFi
network in the United States.1 The network, covering most of the
Harlem neighborhood, will extend 95 city blocks and reach nearly
80,000 residents, including 13,000 public housing occupants, as well as
businesses in and visitors to the area.2 The project is a joint initiative
of the City’s Department of Information Technology and
Telecommunications, its Technology Development Corporation, and
the private Internet Service Provider Sky-Packets, which will provide
access to and manage traffic over the network on the City’s behalf.3
In announcing the project, former Mayor Bloomberg noted that the
project would provide “24/7 access to everything from education
materials for kids, to information about Harlem’s rich history and
attractions, to everyday needs like paying bills [and] checking library
hours.”4
The Harlem WiFi project, while notable in its scope, is consistent
with a growing trend: government-provided access to high-speed
Internet service is on the rise in cities of all sizes. Citizens are coming
to expect “robust and ubiquitous wireless connectivity.”5 This is due
in large part, of course, to the explosion in demand for faster mobile
wireless access through smartphones—ownership of which increased
from 16% of Americans in 2009 to 56% in 2013, a trend roughly
consistent with the introduction and rising popularity of the iPhone.6
These offerings are taking a range of forms. One approach is a
purely public utility model, i.e., government owned-and-operated,
mostly city-wide “municipal broadband” networks built out and

1. See Mayor Bloomberg Announces Country’s Largest Continuous Free Public
WiFi Network, NYC.GOV (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-themayor/news/394-13/mayor-bloomberg-country-s-largest-continuous-free-public-wifinetwork/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. James Eng, Largest Free Public Wi-Fi Network in US Coming to Harlem,
NBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/largest-freepublic-wi-fi-network-us-coming-harlem-f2D11723755.
5. Open Tech. Inst. & CTC Tech. & Energy, The Art of the Possible: An
Overview of Public Broadband Options, NEW AM. FOUND. 19 (May 6, 2014),
http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/TheArtofthePossibleOverviewofPublicBroadbandOptions_NAFOTI-CTC.pdf.
6. Aaron Smith, Smartphone Ownership 2013, PEWRESEARCH INTERNET
PROJECT (June 5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/06/05/smartphoneownership-2013/; see also Open Tech. Inst. & CTC Tech & Energy, supra note 5, at
19.
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managed by cities themselves, such as Chattanooga, Tennessee and
Lafayette, Louisiana.7 Another is the increasingly common publicprivate partnership, such as Harlem WiFi, where a private Internet
Service Provider (ISP) provides Internet access via Hotspot in a
particular public space such as a neighborhood, business district, park,
town hall, or transportation hub, thereby aggregating smaller service
areas within their city limits,8 in cooperation with a municipality or its
administrative subsidiary, at low or no cost to the user.9 As Mayor
Bloomberg noted with respect to Harlem WiFi, all of these projects
are undertaken for manifestly public purposes, from education to
economic development.10 In addition, an underlying motivation on
the part of policymakers is likely the fear of being left behind.
Businesses, residents, and visitors are increasingly expecting highspeed Internet connections in public spaces, and city leaders seem to
believe that if they don’t build it, those businesses, residents, and
visitors will not come.
Concurrent with these efforts is the growing debate over direct
governmental provision of high-speed Internet service, due in part to
the lack of incentives for private ISPs to finance network build-outs
and improve capacity in rural areas.11 Advocates of “fiber-to-thehome” (i.e., direct high-speed residential Internet connections
provided via fiber optic cable) for all Americans have called for
additional public investment of nearly one hundred billion dollars in
federal funding, much of which would go to government-owned and
7. See Brian Fung, How Chattanooga Beat Google Fiber by Half a Decade,
WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/
see
also
2013/09/17/how-chattanooga-beat-google-fiber-by-half-a-decade/;
LAFAYETTE UTIL. SYS. FIBER, http://lusfiber.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
8. See, e.g., infra note 25 (discussing, inter alia, efforts by Chicago, Illinois;
Cambridge, Massachusetts; Kennesaw, Georgia; and Newton, North Carolina).
9. For a detailed study of three large cities’ recent efforts to provide free WiFi to
residents, see SUSAN CRAWFORD ET AL., HARVARD UNIVERSITY BERKMAN CENTER
FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY, RESEARCH PUB. NO. 2014-9, COMMUNITY FIBER IN
WASHINGTON, D.C., SEATTLE, WA, AND SAN FRANCISCO, CA: DEVELOPMENTS AND
LESSONS LEARNED (May 27, 2014), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2014/
community_fiber; see also infra note 68 (discussing WiFi and cellphone service in
New York subway system provided via partnerships between the Metropolitan
Transit Authority and private carrier TransitWireless).
10. See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
11. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C. § 1305
(2012); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL
BROADBAND PLAN 135 (2010), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/nationalbroadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf; Grant Gross, FCC Votes to End
Telephone Subsidies, Shift to Broadband, PCWORLD (Oct. 27, 2011, 12:00 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/242713/fcc_votes_to_end_telephone_subsidies_shift_
to_broadband.html.
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operated networks. 12
To those advocates, the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”)’s seeming abdication of its
commitment to network neutrality in April 201413 has highlighted to
an even greater degree the need to expand municipal-level, utility-run
networks. In addition, the FCC itself seems ready to exercise its
federal preemption authority to protect municipal broadband efforts
from statewide laws that have inhibited municipal broadband
networks in several states14—a proposal that the U.S. Council of
Mayors has recently endorsed.15 For those who believe a subsidy
approach has not succeeded in ensuring high-speed Internet access to

12. See, e.g., SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY
MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 255–57 (2013); see also Sam
Gustin, Is Broadband Internet Access a Public Utility?, TIME (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://business.time.com/2013/01/09/is-broadband-internet-access-a-public-utility/;
Alex Marshall, Who Should Control Broadband?, GOVERNING MAG. (Apr. 2013),
http://www.governing.com/columns/eco-engines/col-public-or-private-sector-whocontrols-broadband.html.
13. See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, The Case for Net Neutrality: What’s Wrong With
FOREIGN
AFF.
(July/Aug.
2014),
Obama’s
Internet
Policy,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141536/marvin-ammori/the-case-for-netneutrality.
14. See Susan Crawford, Op-Ed., The Wire Next Time, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/28/opinion/the-wire-next-time.html?_r=0; Tom
Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks Before the National Cable &
Telecommunications Association (Apr. 30, 2014), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-326852A1.pdf; Tom Wheeler, Removing Barriers to
Competitive Community Broadband, FCC.GOV BLOG (June 10, 2014),
http://www.fcc.gov/blog/removing-barriers-competitive-community-broadband. Two
communities that wish to provide broadband service to other municipalities have
already asked the FCC to preempt state laws they view as obstructive of that goal,
and the Commission has opened a proceeding to consider those
requests. See Petition Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 for Removal of State Barriers to Broadband Investment and Competition, filed
by Electric Power Board, Chattanooga, Tennessee, WC Docket No. 14-116 (filed July
24, 2014); Petition Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
for Removal of State Barriers to Broadband Investment and Competition, filed by
City of Wilson, North Carolina, WC Docket No. 14-115 (filed July 24, 2014).
15. See TRANSP. & COMMC’NS COMM., 82ND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE U.S.
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, RESOLUTION ON PRESERVING A FREE AND OPEN
INTERNET
257
(June
2014),
available
at
http://www.usmayors.org/
82ndAnnualMeeting/media/resolutions-final.pdf; see also Susan Crawford, How
Cities Can Take On Big Cable, BLOOMBERGVIEW (June 27, 2014),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-06-27/how-cities-can-take-on-big-cable
(citing letter sent by Democratic congressional leaders to FCC asking agency to
preempt state laws in order to encourage municipal broadband development);
Andrew Zaleski, Is Municipal Broadband More Important than Net Neutrality?,
FORTUNE (June 26, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/06/26/is-municipal-broadbandmore-important-than-net-neutrality/.
AND

2014]

GOV'T PROVIDED INTERNET ACCESS

1503

all Americans, direct government provision of fiber-based service
seems to be the only solution.16
This “fundamental makeover” of public places from exclusively
physical spaces to mixed spaces with both physical and online aspects
is “alter[ing] the nature, character, and democratic functions of public
places and public expression,” in a range of ways that are not yet
apparent.17 More practically, it also raises the question whether the
management of these networks is subject to the restraints of the
Constitution, and if so, what limitations the First Amendment would
place on interferences with speech carried by those networks. After
all, at their most basic, the networks are speech spaces, provided
either in name or in fact by the State; they are publicly owned
property over which citizen expression travels.
Though the
constitutional questions would seem to logically follow from that
premise, we seem reluctant thus far to ask them.
Considering the Constitution’s applications to these new speech
spaces also raises a host of subsidiary questions, all of which are, to
this point, unresolved. For example:
 Are government-provided Internet networks public fora?
 Where a private ISP is the service-provider-in-fact for a
nominally “public” Internet access point, is the ISP a state
actor for that purpose?
 If so, does the First Amendment limit the ISP’s capacity for
content-based interferences with traffic over its network, even
if the interference is intended to prevent lawless conduct by
users or others?
 And if users must accede to the prospect of such interferences
ex ante in exchange for access pursuant to the municipality’s
and/or the network’s terms of service, are the doctrines of
unconstitutional conditions and prior restraint implicated
thereby?

16. See Crawford, The Wire Next Time, supra note 14 (“It’s clear that fiber
networks are a natural monopoly and need to be either run directly by the
government, or so heavily regulated that it amounts to the same thing.”).
17. Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and
Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007); see also Jack M. Balkin, Digital

Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the
Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004) (noting that information
communications technology lowers “the costs of transmission, distribution,
appropriation, and alteration of information” because “[digital] speech is
participatory and interactive. People don’t merely watch (or listen to) the Internet as
if it were television or radio. Rather, they surf through it, they program on it, they
publish to it, they write comments and continually add things to it.”).
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The answers to these questions—and to forecast a bit, this Article’s
answers to all but the first are “yes”—have important implications for
public safety, free expression, and digital development in our urban
spaces. Both network managers and users need to understand these
issues so as to shape their conduct in these twenty-first century speech
spaces accordingly. In the rush to embrace dynamic communications
technologies that enable us to leave behind temporal and spatial
limitations on speech, we risk losing sight of the Constitution’s
commands. If we do so, and accept these State-provided digital
speech spaces as part of our communications infrastructure without
thinking through the relevant First Amendment questions, we will
sacrifice historical protection and respect for freedom of speech from
governmental interference at the altar of the new.
Part I of this Article provides, by way of background, a taxonomy
of the arrangements that municipalities are using to provide free WiFi
access to their citizens. Part II examines whether these networks are
public fora, and thus whether the special First Amendment rules
imposed by the public forum doctrine apply to them. Part III
sketches out some rules for network administrators to apply in order
to comply with the First Amendment. Part IV considers the state
action doctrine with respect to public-private networks, and concludes
the obligations set out in Part III would apply to both the “municipal
broadband” networks owned and operated by municipalities and,
more controversially, to private ISPs offering free Internet access on
behalf of local governments. Finally, Part V contemplates the
interaction between contract and constitutional law that is raised by
terms of service between government Internet access providers and
members of the public.
I. A TAXONOMY OF GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED DIGITAL SPEECH
SPACES
As noted above, broadband deployment has been a federal priority
for many years. More recently, however, an increasing number of
local governments have begun their own initiatives. Back in 2003,
Sharon Gillett and her MIT colleagues classified these efforts on the
local level into four categories based on the “role[] of government vis
a vis broadband: as user, rulemaker, financier, and infrastructure
provider.”18 The role of “infrastructure provider” included not simply

18. Sharon E. Gillett et al., Local Government Broadband Initiatives, 28
TELECOMM. POL’Y 537 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2063217. Gillett uses the term “user” broadly, to mean
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the local government’s “manage[ment of the] design, funding, and
construction” of broadband access for its citizens, but also operation
of the network—i.e., the broadband network owner and service
provider.19 More recently, the New America Foundation’s Open
Technology Institute, which advocates for public broadband
adoption, classified public broadband similarly, noting models
“rang[ing] from a centrally coordinated government initiative to a
shared partnership between a private entity and a local
government.”20
With respect to the “infrastructure provider” category, both Gillett
et al.’s and the Open Technology Institute’s research noted a familiar
split between those municipalities that provided direct broadband
service and those that did not. The majority of the former were
smaller communities that were underserved or unserved by the
private ISP market because of their size and/or geography; there, “the
public sector probably provides broadband . . . because no one else
does.” 21 Twenty years ago, supermajorities of voters in rural
municipalities underserved by private ISPs approved bonds to finance
public broadband networks in their communities that would be
operated and administered by the public utilities serving their
communities. 22 By contrast, larger communities that were better
served by commercial providers were taking less active coordinationand-facilitation roles, such as granting infrastructure rights to private
ISPs, providing subsidies or other in-kind preferences to commercial
projects, or aggregating citizen demand to sweeten the business case
for private ISPs reluctant to enter their markets—what Gillett et al.
considered “user,” “financier,” or “rulemaker” roles.23
The functional split between large and small towns with respect to
broadband access, however, has decreased in salience over the past
ten years. Cities and counties of all sizes are now developing free

government as “stimulator of demand,” as either “buyer, facilitator of aggregation [of
service areas by commercial ISPs serving the municipality], or “lead user.” Id. at 8.
19. See id. at 5.
20. Open Tech. Inst. & CTC Tech. & Energy, supra note 5, at 7.
21. Gillett et al., supra note 18, at 36.
22. Steven C. Carlson, A Historical, Economic, and Legal Analysis of Municipal
Ownership of the Information Highway, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 7–8
(1999) (citing approval rates of 88% in Alta, Iowa, and 94% in Muscatine, Iowa, the
latter despite the incumbent cable company’s outspending of proponents by over 100
to 1); see also John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on Competitive
Broadband Technologies, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 85, 104 (2009) (“[L]iterally hundreds
of cities . . . announced plans for various types of municipal broadband projects—
most of them wireless networks.”).
23. See Gillett et al., supra note 18, at 1.
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WiFi networks at a rapid pace, both on their own and in collaboration
with private operators.24 Larger cities, even those that are arguably
well-served by the private wireless market, are providing their own
broadband access points to the public, often by aggregating smaller
service areas within their city limits.25 Furthermore, the municipally
owned-and-operated network model is no longer limited to those
communities where incentives for private sector network rollouts are
lacking, as evidenced by, for example, San Francisco’s new free
municipally-built and owned WiFi service along Market Street. 26
Pursuant to these efforts, as of 2011, over 125 municipalities offered
city-wide WiFi,27 and more than 75 cities had large outdoor WiFi
Hotspots, mostly in parks and downtown areas.28

24. See, e.g., Sharon E. Gillett, Municipal Wireless Broadband: Hype or
Harbinger?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 565–81 (2006); Josh Constine, Google Pays
$600K to Give Free Wi-Fi to 31 San Francisco Parks, TECHCRUNCH (July 24, 2013),
http://techcrunch.com/2013/07/24/free-wifi-san-francisco-google; Joanna Stern, New
York City Pay Phone Booths Now Free WiFi Hotspots, ABC NEWS (July 11, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/york-city-pay-phone-booths-now-free-wifi/
story?id=16756016#.Ud7X-DvR2So.
25. See, e.g., Cambridge Public Internet (CPI) WiFi Access Points,
CAMBRIDGEMA.GOV, http://www.cambridgema.gov/itd/CPI.aspx (last visited Oct. 15,
2014). For an example of the City of Chicago’s approach, see Greg Hinz, City
Unveils Plan For Free Wi-Fi, Wider Super-Fast Internet, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Sept.
24, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20120924/BLOGS02/
120929936/city-unveils-plan-for-free-wi-fi-wider-super-fast-internet;
Dep’t
of
Procurement Servs., City of Chi., Request for Information (RFI) for Broadband
Infrastructure Expansion, CITY OF CHICAGO, http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/
dam/city/depts/dps/ContractAdministration/Specs/2012/Spec111304.pdf
(detailing
intended coverage areas throughout Chicago); Press Release, Mayor’s Press Office,
Mayor Emanuel Announces Chicago Broadband Challenge (Sept. 24, 2012),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%
20Releases/2012/September/9.24.12broadbandchallenge.pdf.
Smaller cities are
following an aggregation strategy as well. See, e.g., About Us, KENNESAWWIFI.NET,
http://www.kennesawwifi.net/about.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). For a map
showing WiFi access points in the City of Newton, North Carolina, see City of
Newton, MERAKI, http://p13.meraki.com/network/CityofNewton (last visited Oct. 15,
2014).
26. See John Coté, S.F. Rolls Out 3 Miles of Free Wi-Fi Along Market Street, S.F.
CHRON. (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/S-F-rolls-out-3-milesof-free-Wi-Fi-along-Market-5067616.php#photo-3584032; San Francisco Wi-Fi,
SFGov, http://www6.sfgov.org/index.aspx?page=246 (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
27. See Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 795, 805 (2012)
(citing CHRISTOPHER MITCHELL, PUBLICLY OWNED BROADBAND NETWORKS:
AVERTING THE LOOMING BROADBAND MONOPOLY (2011)).
28. Esme Vos, Updated List of US Cities and Counties with Large Scale WiFi
Networks, MUNIWIRELESS.COM (June 7, 2010), http://www.muniwireless.com/2010/
06/07/updated-list-of-cities-and-counties-with-wifi/ [hereinafter Vos, Updated List];
Esme Vos, AT&T Launches Free WiFi in New York City Parks,
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The business aspects of the joint venture-type arrangements for
broadband service differ according to the nature of the agreement
between the municipality and its commercial partner.
Cities
sometimes entice private companies to offer these services to the
public in exchange for their own government telecommunications
contracts. 29 In other arrangements, private telecommunications
providers donate hardware and/or service for publicly owned
networks.30 Some commercial partners also build out and operate
networks for cities in return for the right to display advertising or
locally focused content to users. 31 The “functional boundary”
between government and the private sector with respect to these
networks is thus largely contract-dependent, and can differ widely
from network to network. 32 However, a common characteristic
among these efforts is the municipality offering the service in its own
name, but contracting the building and/or operation of the network to
the private sector.33
It is certainly likely that the conceptual shift from direct
government city-wide service to mixed service models is attributable
to legislative lobbying by ISPs, which has restricted or effectively
barred municipalities in nearly twenty states from owning and
operating their own broadband networks.34
MUNIWIRELESS.COM (June 9, 2011), http://www.muniwireless.com/2011/06/09/attlaunches-free-wifi-in-new-york-city-parks/.
29. See Gillett et al., supra note 18, at 11 (discussing aggregated municipal units as
“anchor tenants” for commercial telecommunications services, and the benefits
municipalities negotiate in exchange for such arrangements).
30. This is also true with respect to publicly owned networks. See, e.g., Coté,
supra note 26.
31. See, e.g., Microsoft and MetroFi Team Up on Free Wireless Internet in
Portland, Ore., MICROSOFT, (Nov. 14, 2006), https://www.microsoft.com/enus/news/press/2006/nov06/11-14metrofipr.aspx. However, the private ISP operating
the ad-supported free wireless network on behalf of Portland went out of business.
See Jacqueline Emigh, In Portland, Oregon, Another City-wide Wi-Fi Network Bites
the Dust, BETANEWS, http://betanews.com/2008/02/22/in-portland-oregon-anothercity-wide-wi-fi-network-bites-the-dust/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
32. Gillett et al., supra note 18, at 18.
33. For a more in-depth discussion of these arrangements, see infra notes 67–75
and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., François Bar & Namkee Park, Municipal Wi-Fi Networks: The
Goals, Practices, and Policy Implications of the U.S. Case, 61 COMM. & STRATEGIES
107, 107 (2006) (detailing the growing number of municipal WiFi networks in the
U.S. and abroad), noted in Michael A. Janson & Christopher S. Yoo, The Wires Go

To War: The U.S. Experiment with Government Ownership of the Telephone
System During World War I, 91 TEX. L. REV. 983, 987 n.18 (2013); Gillett et al., supra
note 18, at 19–20; Susan Crawford, U.S. Internet Users Pay More for Slower Service,
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Dec. 27, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/
articles/2012-12-27/u-s-internet-users-pay-more-for-slower-service (detailing Time
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However, in both types of cases—government-as-infrastructureprovider, where a municipality acts as network operator, and
government-as-joint-venture-partner, where a commercial operator
manages the network on the government’s behalf—citizens will use
these networks to transmit First Amendment-protected speech. The
next three Parts of this Article set out some of the constitutional
issues raised by this fact and suggest possible ways to resolve them.
II. FORUM DOCTRINE: NOT THE A NSWER
With respect to whether the First Amendment should apply to
municipal Internet networks, public forum doctrine would seem to
offer one path. However, as I have argued previously, it seems clear
(at least to me) that State-provided Internet networks, offered either
directly by a municipal utility or in partnership with a private ISP as
the service-provider-in-fact, are neither traditional nor designated
public fora.35 Forum doctrine comes from the theory of easement:
when the public openly uses public space for communication, it earns
a type of speech easement by prescription, which remains available
for subsequent members of the public to use to communicate.36 The
State, as owner of the servient estate, cannot then eject speakers from
that space for content-based reasons.37 The presence or absence of
historical use of the space or similar spaces for speech, as manifested
in traditional public forum doctrine, is thus dispositive. Where the
claim is that the government has designated a space for speech, intent
to grant the public general access to the space for that purpose must
be present, or no forum will be found.38

Warner’s successful efforts in the North Carolina legislature to pass a law banning
municipal broadband service in that state, and noting that “[e]ighteen other states
have laws that make it extremely difficult or impossible for cities to provide this
service to their residents.”); Jesse Drucker, Wireless Warrior, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13,
2006,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113943275592368690.html
(“[L]egislatures in at least 14 states and Congress proposed legislation to restrict
municipal wireless efforts.”). By one account, at least thirty-five states have
considered such legislation. See Blevins, supra note 22, at 110 n.127 (citing FED.
COMMC’NS COMM’N, BRINGING BROADBAND TO RURAL AMERICA: REPORT ON A
RURAL BROADBAND STRATEGY 53 n.308 (2009)).
35. See generally Enrique Armijo, Kill Switches, Forum Doctrine, and the First
Amendment’s Digital Future, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 411 (2014).
36. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana,
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13 (1965).
37. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
38. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (citing
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
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With these rules (admittedly overgeneralized here) in place, it is
unlikely that a government-provided Internet network would be
deemed a public forum by a reviewing court. The modernity of a
space nearly always eliminates it from traditional public forum
eligibility. Additionally, so far as designated public forum status,
cases like United States v. American Library Association,39 United
States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Associations,40 and Denver
Area Educational Television Consortium v. FCC 41 treat Stateprovided speech spaces such as Internet public library terminals, the
Postal Service, and public access television channels as access
information points rather than networked exchanges. These findings
cut against concluding the spaces at issue in those cases were
designated public fora since, as discussed, a public forum needs a
speech easement, and a speech easement by designation must be
intended to serve both speakers and listeners.42
However, even if a municipal WiFi network cannot be a traditional
or designated public forum, even nonpublic fora—property owned or
controlled by the government, but “not by tradition or designation a
39. See 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003).
40. See 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981).
41. See 518 U.S. 727, 740 (1996) (Breyer, J., plurality opinion); id. at 768 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (“I am convinced that it would be unwise to take a categorical
approach to the resolution of novel First Amendment questions arising in an industry
as dynamic as this.”); id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[N]ot every nuance of our
old standards will necessarily do for the new technology, and . . . a proper choice
among existing doctrinal categories is not obvious.”); id. at 779–80 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“[W]e should not yet undertake fully to adapt our First Amendment
doctrine to the new context we confront here.”); id. at 829–30 (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Scalia, J., and Rehnquist,
C.J.) (“We have expressly stated that neither government ownership nor government
control will guarantee public access to property . . . . [U]nlike a park picketer, an
access programmer cannot transmit its own message. Instead, it is the operator who
must transmit, or ‘speak,’ the access programmer’s message.”).
42. As the Court said in American Library Association, providing Internet access
at library terminals no more designates a public forum than “collect[ing] books”
designates a “public forum for the authors of [the] books to speak.” 539 U.S. at 206.
Rather, the terminals were intended “to facilitate research, learning, and recreational
pursuits” for patrons. Id. at 195. There was no intent, in other words, to foster the
speech of website developers or open a communications channel between those
developers and library patrons. See generally id. Similarly, in Greenburgh, the Court
stated that its cases did not support the “sweeping proposition” that “simply because
an instrumentality is used for the communication of ideas and information, it thereby
becomes a public forum.” 453 U.S. at 130 n.6.
As I have previously noted, Denver Area Consortium convincingly
demonstrates that the Court’s refusal to find new speech spaces to be traditional
public fora has bled into its designated public forum analysis, which has completed
the “erosion of forum doctrine’s categorical approach to speech rights on public
property.” Armijo, supra note 35, at 440.

1510

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

forum for public communication”43—impose some restrictions on the
State’s ability to interfere with speech. In particular, the State may
exclude speakers from nonpublic fora so long as the exclusion is
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.44 Accordingly, a municipality may
restrict speech or speakers from its network, but if that network is
deemed a nonpublic forum, the speaker may not be excluded if, for
example, the speaker criticizes the municipality or its officials.
Likewise, any content-based parameters that the municipality
imposes on the network will be judged by a reasonableness
standard;45 for example, it would likely be found reasonable for a city
to block access to constitutionally protected but offensive content in a
public space such as a park or downtown area, out of concerns that
unsupervised children might be able to view the material.46 Some
content-based proscriptions on network use, on the other hand, such
as a ban on using the network to organize a protest or nonviolent
public disruption, might be found unreasonable. Nonpublic forum
analysis, in other words, applies only to the State’s worst offenses
against free expression.
The current easement-derived understanding of forum doctrine
compels the conclusion that municipally provided Internet networks
are not public fora. However, other, more expansive interpretations
of the doctrine might prove more protective. For example, some
scholars have argued that the historical public trust doctrine is a
better way to resolve speech-in-public-space questions than the forum
doctrine.47 Public trust doctrine derives from Roman and English
law, which stripped the King’s power to prohibit common public uses
of rivers, seas, and shores, in effect making sovereign ownership of
those lands in trust for the public’s benefit, rather than in fee.48
Extrapolated to free speech debates, a public trust doctrine approach
to speech on public property would call for sublimating State-owned

43. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
44. Id.
45. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1991 (2011).
46. Cf. id. at 2000–02 (citing cases where public order, decorum, and civilityrelated rules validly infringed on citizen’s otherwise protected speech in the context
of city council or other governmental meetings). To use an earthbound analogy, the
First Amendment does not foreclose a “no nude dancing on the playground” rule.
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (holding that the government
has important interest in protecting children from indecent material).
47. See generally Marie A. Failinger, New Wine, New Bottles: Private Property
Metaphors and Public Forum Speech, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 217, 312–13 (1997).
48. See Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of
Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 647 (1995) (citing
Failinger, supra note 47, at n.423 and accompanying text).

2014]

GOV'T PROVIDED INTERNET ACCESS

1511

management of its property to citizens’ choices with respect to the
content of their communication because the State’s “ownership” of
the property is fiduciary in nature and subject to the interest of its
trustees—here, the public.
Though public trust doctrine perhaps sounds like a more noble
methodology to apply to First Amendment questions, it offers much
less in the way of actually answering them in the particular context of
network management and ex ante interferences with digital speech.
For example, would the State be barred from momentarily blocking
access to Facebook in a particular public space if the site were being
used to coordinate or otherwise incite imminent collective action in
that space that might be criminal in nature? On the one hand, the
State is clearly interfering with its trustees’ right to free speech; on the
other hand, other trustees, who would otherwise suffer from the
conduct the speech was in the process of facilitating, would be mighty
grateful. When members of the public have opposing interests, the
public trust model fails to tell us which trustee wins out.
Alternatively, one could argue that as a matter of both First
Amendment law and democracy-promoting information policy, the
State, as owner of property in public trust, is obliged to establish what
Jack Balkin calls an “infrastructure of free expression” that bars
content-based interferences with citizen speech using public space, or
at the very least those that are applied to speech ex ante.49 In the end,
however, and in either case, the public trust approach to forum
questions seems to assess the costs and benefits associated with the
State’s speech interferences—a task our existing levels of First
Amendment scrutiny already perform.
Similarly, forum doctrine is often read to permit the government to
bar those uses of its property that are incompatible with the
property’s intended use.50 With respect to speech carried over a
municipal broadband network, there is no prima facie incompatibility.
The State establishes, develops, and designs the network to carry
data, and the expressive activity for which the network is intended to
be used is indistinguishable as a technical matter from those purposes.

49. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 2296, 2301 (2014); Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital
Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 432 (2009).
50. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 819–20
(1985); see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the objective, physical characteristics of the
property at issue and the actual public access and uses that have been permitted by
the government indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and
compatible with those uses, the property is a public forum.”).
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One wonders, however, whether a court reviewing a municipality’s
content-related restrictions on the use of its network could be trusted
to operate at such a speech-favorable level of abstraction.
For example, assume a network’s enabling legislation states that
the municipality intended to offer Internet access to, per the above,
provide “24/7 access to everything from education materials to kids,
to information about Harlem’s rich history and attractions, to
everyday needs like paying bills [and] checking library hours.” 51
Would a policy that barred use of the network to promulgate the
“depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of
citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion” be “incompatible” with
the municipality’s intended use?52 Incompatibility analysis in forum
doctrine cases has often focused on physical incompatibility between
the intended expression and the government’s intended use of the
public property—e.g., in-person solicitation of travelers is
incompatible with the purpose of an airport terminal, which is to
ensure those travelers can promptly reach their flight gates.53 The
reason for that limitation, of course, is that those cases dealt with
physical spaces. In the virtual context, a government could easily
make the argument that some expression is incompatible with the
government’s intended purposes for the property because of the
expression’s content. As noted, if the property is deemed to be a
nonpublic forum, a reviewing court would uphold reasonable contentbased proscriptions on expressive uses of the property.
Despite all that, even though courts might find that a Stateprovided communications network is a public forum under either the
easement approach or another, nominally speech-friendlier approach,
there is a significant risk that the doctrine would be applied only to
the physical space from which the speaker “speaks,” rather than to
the networked space that the speaker and listener share.54 Since we

51. Eng, supra note 4.
52. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952).
53. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 685.
54. For an example of this analysis, consider Bay Area Rapid Transit’s responses
to claims that it violated the First Amendment when it turned off its cellphone service
repeaters when it received word of a protest within its train stations in August 2011.
BART claimed that there was no First Amendment violation because its train
platforms were established to facilitate transportation rather than speech, and thus
were neither traditional nor designated public fora. See Bob Franklin, A Letter from
BART to Our Customers, BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT (Aug. 20, 2011),
http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110820 (“BART has designated the
areas of its stations that are accessible to the general public without the purchase of
tickets as unpaid areas that are open for expressive activity upon issuance of a permit
subject to BART’s rules.”).
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are not necessarily dealing with shared physical spaces in the context
of online speech, forum doctrine thus undervalues, if not ignores, the
listener’s rights to receive information—a result that does violence to
the freedom-of-assembly-protective principles underlying forum
doctrine in the first place.55 If forum doctrine is anything, it is pathdependent. Hence, with forum doctrine off the table, we are left with
the plain old First Amendment and the question of whether it applies
to these spaces on its own terms.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT RULES FOR GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED
INTERNET ACCESS
A. The First Amendment Interest in Nondiscriminatory Speech
Carriage
If the State carries the messages of speakers, then case law
confirms that the First Amendment compels nondiscriminatory
treatment of those messages. For example, in Lamont v. Postmaster
General, a federal statute empowered the Postmaster General to
confiscate foreign-originated mail that he deemed to be “Communist
propaganda,” of which a recipient could request delivery, upon
receiving notice of confiscation. 56 The Lamont petitioner, a
pamphleteer who received notice of the Post Office’s confiscation of
his copy of the Peking Review, sought to enjoin the statute’s
enforcement, arguing that it violated his First Amendment right to
receive information. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed, noting
that “[t]he United States may give up the post office when it sees fit,
but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part
of free speech as the right to use our tongues . . . .”57
Independent of forum doctrine, the First Amendment mandates
that government not discriminate in its carriage of user speech. This
conclusion is supported by the doctrine of common carriage, which
requires the government to provide access to its services without
making “individualized decisions in particular cases [concerning]

55. As the Court said in its primary case adopting the doctrine, the public forum is
intended to preserve associational spaces for “assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org.,
307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120
YALE L.J. 978, 1015–16 (2011) (“[I]t is assembly, not the actions of a street-corner
speaker, that is at the heart of the public forum doctrine.”).
56. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
57. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255
U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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whether and on what terms to serve” members of the public.58 With
respect to the carriage of speech, the federal government has long
since decided that freedom from government interference is essential
to the development of the mail system.59 The same rule necessarily
applies to speech transmitted digitally. As a service open to all, a
public broadband network must not discriminate among users or
constitutionally protected content carried by that network.
Despite this rule, which amounts to a First Amendment-informed
network management principle, a network operator must have the
technical ability to protect the network and its users against attacks.
Viruses and malware interfere with other users’ speech over the
network, granting what I have previously called a “hacker’s veto”
over lawful speech-related uses. 60
Thus, despite the First
Amendment’s application to these speech spaces, the State’s network
operator should be free to make content-neutral technical
management decisions that have the effect of keeping a network safe
and operable. Such decisions would likely be permissible as
time/place/manner restrictions under ordinary First Amendment
doctrine.
B.

A Workable Nondiscrimination Principle for Digital Speech
Carriage

If the First Amendment is a network management principle for
municipally provided Internet networks, the question remains how
that principle should be put into effect. This Subpart outlines these
obligations in greater detail.
Thanks to technological advances in deep packet inspection, there
is no doubt that ISPs have the ability to examine, “on a ‘real time’
basis, both routing information . . . [and] the actual content contained
in . . . every packet that traverses the ISP’s network.”61 The issue then

58. Jonathan S. Marashlian et al., The Mis-Administration and Misadventures of
the Universal Service Fund: A Study in the Importance of the Administrative
Procedure Act to Government Agency Rulemaking, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 343,
368 (2011).
59. This principle was manifested in the Postal Clause’s granting of a public
monopoly in postal service to the Congress, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2, which
“put the federal government in the common carrier business.” ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL,
TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 17 (1983); see also Armijo, supra note 35, at 443–45.
60. Armijo, supra note 35, at 446.
61. See Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment: How Internet

Service Providers Leverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral
Conduits, 12 JOURN. OF CONSTITUTIONAL L. 1279, 1311-12 (2010). “Deep packet
inspection” technology permits network providers to identify both the applications
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turns to ensuring that the State exercises this capacity in a speechprotective way. As I have argued previously, to use a framework
proposed by Thomas Nachbar and propounded in the debates around
network neutrality, State-run communications networks must be: (1)
user-neutral—i.e., that the network should provide continuous service
to any user seeking to connect to it, to the extent such service is
technologically feasible; and (2) use-neutral—i.e., that the network
should not bar devices or applications of any type from being used on
it, except for those that would threaten the stability of the network.62
Because the network is owned and/or operated by the State, the userand use-based discrimination rules should track the rule, which
currently governs in physical public space: punishing users for
accessing or disseminating illegal or otherwise unprotected speech
over the State’s network must occur ex post. In other words, the
preemptive denials of access that would, in a non-digital context, be
treated as prior restraints, namely, content-based disconnection or
denials of carriage, should be presumptively barred.
IV. PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERNET ACCESS PARTNERSHIPS AND
STATE ACTION
If State-run Internet networks may not discriminate on the basis of
content, there remains the question of which networks, other than
those provided directly by a municipality pursuant to the utility
model, should be considered “State-run.”63 In the case of publicprivate partnerships, the answer is clear: where the municipality and
its service-provider-in-fact enjoy an “overlapping identity” with
respect to the service, and the municipality undertakes to provide
Internet access pursuant to its residents’ general welfare, then the
private partner is a state actor bound by the First Amendment to the
same degree as the State would be had it provided the service itself.64
used on their networks and the content that users transmit often in real time, using
keyword searches and other monitoring techniques. Using DPI, the network
operator has the ability to decide which applications or content will be transmitted
and at what speed. See id.; see generally M. Chris Riley & Ben Scott, Deep Packet
Inspection: The End of the Internet as We Know It?, FREE PRESS, (Mar. 18, 2009),
http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-legacy/Deep_Packet_Inspection_The_
End_of_the_Internet_As_We_Know_It.pdf.
62. Thomas B. Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 67,
127–28 (2008); see also Armijo, supra note 35, at 462.
63. Cf. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11–15 (1978)
(holding that a municipal utility is a state actor and thus obliged to comply with Due
Process Clause when terminating a citizen’s service).
64. See Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 829 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that
the private actor’s choice is “deemed to be that of the state” when the state
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The “entwinement” approach to state action questions asks
whether the contacts between the State and its private partner, in
providing a service to the public, become so extensive that, as a
matter of fairness, the latter’s conduct is fairly attributable to the
former.65 With respect to public-private partnerships for high-speed
Internet service, municipalities pass ordinances that enable their
administrative subsidiaries to enter into contractual arrangements
with private ISPs to provide Internet access, delivered in public
spaces to any willing users at no cost. 66 They do so for
quintessentially public reasons. As noted above, municipalities
provide high-speed Internet access for the general public welfare,
meeting social needs such as economic development,67 public safety,68
education,69 and reducing the cost citizens would otherwise pay to
purely private carriers for broadband access.70 Those cities enter

“exercise[s] such coercive power or provide[s] . . . significant encouragement, either
overt or covert”).
65. See id.
66. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966).
67. See, e.g., Chattanooga, Tenn., Res. No. 23446 (2002) (enacted), available at
http://www.ilsr.org/rule/2515-2/ (finding that “local businesses consider the level of
technological advancement of the City and the surrounding area when electing to
remain” and that provision of “Internet services” will be “a significant, integral and
necessary step in the City’s economic development efforts”); San Jose, Cal., Request
for Proposals # 13-14-12: Maintenance and Expansion of Downtown Wireless
Network Utilizing Ruckus Wireless Equipment (Feb. 26, 2014), at 12 (wireless
Internet service would “help drive economic impact in our community”) (on file with
author); Agreement for the Purchase and Installation of a Downtown WiFi Mesh
Network By and Between the City of San Jose and SmartWave Technologies LLC
(July 3, 2012), “Project Objectives,” at 13 (service would “stimulate economic
development” and help residents and visitors “to learn about downtown”); id. at 15,
“City Responsibilities” (obligating city to promote “the use and value of wireless
communications to enhance the Silicon Valley life”) (on file with author).
68. See Matt Flegenheimer, Wi-Fi and Cellphone Service on Subway Trains?
M.T.A. Leader Says It May Happen, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/nyregion/mta-plans-wi-fi-and-phone-service-onsubway-trains.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytimes&_r=0 (stating that the
M.T.A. frames expansion of wireless and cellphone service on trains “as a safety
issue”).
69. See, e.g., S. 78, 2011 Gen. Assembly, ¶ 16 (Vt. 2011), available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2012/Acts/ACT053.pdf.
70. See, e.g.,
AMMON, IDAHO,
CITY CODE §
8-9-1 (2011),
http://www.ci.ammon.id.us/pdf/citycode/07012013AmmonCityCode.pdf (stating that
the purpose of the law is to establish a City owned fiber optic system in order to, inter
alia, “protect the cost of broadband services by eliminating anti-competitive pricing
schemes or monopolistic practices which contribute to higher costs for broadband
services.”). With respect to this note and the one immediately preceding, it bears
emphasis that where an action is “specifically authorized by an official exercising
statutory authority,” activity undertaken pursuant to that authority is “substantively a
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partnerships with private entities to meet the same ends.71 Publicprivate contracts for service delivery are of course not enough by
themselves to render the private counterparty a state actor. 72
However, when the State receives benefits from the contract that
extend well beyond the service delivery itself, then the private party’s
actions should be attributable to the State. And when those
concomitant benefits are public in nature, the conclusion that the
private party is a state actor should be readily reached.
As Justice Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases notes, where a
“corporation or individual wield[s] power under state authority for
the public benefit or the public convenience,” the Constitution should
apply to the corporation or individual’s acts.73 The arrangements at
issue here provide significant public benefits. For example, in
soliciting partners for the Wireless Corridor Challenge, a public
access WiFi project intended to provide connectivity to several of the
City’s commercial districts, the New York City Economic
Development Corporation stated that “in recent years WiFi . . . has
become the newest urban requirement.” “Better connectivity in the
City’s commercial districts,” the EDC’s model contract for the service
continued, “will be critical to the City’s businesses, residents and
visitors, and to the City’s ability to drive growth and innovation and
to maintain its competitiveness.”74 An ambitious project that plans to
place free WiFi Hotspots in New York City’s 7000 public payphones
will “help support job seekers, freelancers, residents in need of
affordable broadband services, small businesses, the local tech
state action.” Daphne Barak-Erez, State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization,
45 SYR. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (1995).
71. See, e.g., City of New York Department of Information Technology &
Telecommunications, Request for Proposals for a Franchise to Install, Operate, and
Maintain Public Communications Structures in the Boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn,
Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island, PIN # 8582014 FRANCH 3 (April 30, 2014),
at 3–6, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doitt/downloads/pdf/DoITT-Public-CommunicationStructure-RFP-4-30-14.pdf [hereinafter Reimagining Payphones Project RFP].
72. See Dickerson v. Cal. Waste Solutions, No. C 08-03773 WHA, 2009 WL
2913452 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2009).
73. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 59 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
74. New York City Economic Development Corporation Wireless Corridor
Challenge Consultant Contract No. 55530001: Flatiron/23rd St. Partnership District
Management Ass’n, App’x. B-2, “Goals and Objectives” (on file with author). As
part of these agreements, the Corporation’s counterparties were required to “identify
populations” in the service area “that will benefit from the wireless network,” and to
“create projections to estimate the impact of the wireless network on commercial
activity” in that area, “including the ability to attract new businesses to the
neighborhood, connect commercial corridors, and increase foot traffic/marketing of
[the served] business district.” Id., App’x. B-3-4, “Wireless Network Neighborhood
Plan” (on file with author).
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industry and visitors.”75 Similarly, the agreement establishing the
aforementioned Harlem WiFi project, between New York City’s
Department of Information Technology and Telecommunication,
Sky-Packets, and the Mayor’s Fund to Advance New York City, notes
that the Fund’s goals are to “encourag[e], promot[e], and advanc[e]
activities and programs to assist the City of New York in the
implementation of civic improvements and social welfare programs
and otherwise cooperating with the City in promoting the general
welfare of the City’s residents.”76 Social and general welfare are
bedrock public purposes, even if New York City is meeting them with
the assistance of a private ISP.77 Public benefits and public burdens
go hand-in-hand.
Counterarguments to this conclusion, however, are readily
available. Per some cases applying the state action doctrine’s “public
function” inquiry, a private entity is not a state actor if the service it
provides is not one that has been “traditionally exclusively reserved
to the State.”78 Providing high-speed Internet is not an exclusive
“traditional state function” and the example might be distinguishable
on that basis.79 If citizen access to high-speed Internet service is not a
function that has been “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
State”80 in the same way as providing roads, parks, lights, water, or
gas may be—and there is little doubt that it has not, given the
longstanding dominance of private ISPs in our communications
infrastructure—then a company providing it on the State’s behalf
might not be considered a state actor. 81 The traditional public
function analysis, in particular the Rehnquist Court’s emphasis on the
exclusively sovereign nature of the function in question, carries real
force as a limiting principle in state action questions.

75. Reimagining Payphones Project RFP, supra note 71, at 3–6, 18.
76. Harlem WiFi Agreement, p. 1 (Nov. 4, 2013) (alteration in original) (on file
with author).
77. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 374 (1995) (holding
that Amtrak is a state actor because it was created by statute and “explicitly for the
furtherance of federal governmental goals”).
78. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (emphasis added).
79. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (finding the operation of
“privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes, and railroads” to be “essentially a public
function”); cf. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350 n.7. (finding “companies engaged in providing
gas, power, or water; all common carriers, pipeline companies, telephone and
telegraph companies, sewage collection and disposal companies; and corporations
affiliated with any company engaging in such activities” are not engaged in
traditionally exclusive State functions).
80. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
81. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352.
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Additionally, ever since its conceptual birth in the Court’s Civil
Rights Cases in 1883,82 the state action doctrine has historically been
more concerned with violations of the Fourteenth Amendment than
of the First. Paradigmatic state action cases involve instances where
the State has sought to preserve discriminatory practices and evade
the Constitution’s proscriptions of the same by offloading state
functions to private actors. For example, in Evans v. Newton, a city
had transferred operational control over a park to private trustees in
order to avoid desegregating it, which would have been contrary to
the “for whites only” terms of the park’s establishing testamentary
trust.83 Despite the trustee’s control over the space, however, the
Supreme Court found that the private trustees were state actors
because the park served a primarily public purpose. 84 Though
Newton supports the conclusion argued here, as Rodney Smolla and
Melville Nimmer have pointed out, the doctrine is viewed more
expansively in the Equal Protection context than in the speech
context.85 No one would doubt, for example, that if Sky-Packets were
to refuse to serve a particular area of Harlem as part of the Harlem
WiFi project on the ground that the area was overwhelmingly made
up of long-time African American residents, the Equal Protection
Clause would be implicated, even though the City was not the serviceprovider-in-fact.
It may not follow, however, that the First
Amendment would apply with similar force to an analogous set of
facts.86
Despite these counterarguments, it certainly seems true that the
First Amendment should reach a private party that is transmitting
speech on the State’s behalf, particularly when the State is holding
itself out as transmitter-in-fact to the public. Indeed, the state action
doctrine’s “public function” test was first adopted in a First
Amendment case—Marsh v. Alabama.87 To be sure, Marsh itself has
been construed narrowly.88 However, its core holding—that when a
private party stands in the shoes of the State, the Constitution applies

82. See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine:
The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 338–39 (1997).
83. See 382 U.S. 296, 297 (1966).
84. Id. at 301.
85. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 16:26
(2009).
86. But see Jackson, 419 U.S. at 373–74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (doubting that
“different standards [can] apply to state-action analysis when different constitutional
claims are presented”).
87. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
88. See, e.g., Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 1989).
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to the party’s conduct—remains salient. More recent decisions have
turned away from an “all or nothing question of governmental
exclusivity” to a more nuanced public function analysis, as well as a
willingness to consider the combined weight of public function along
with other state action factors like entwinement.89 If state action
jurisprudence continues in this direction, the mere fact that other
private ISPs exist would not bar such an ISP from being found a state
actor when it is providing citizens Internet access on a municipality’s
behalf.
Ultimately, the state action rule proposed by this Article is simple:
if a municipality claims to provide high-speed Internet service to
members of the public in its own name, and the municipality has
pointed to important public purposes in delegating authority to the
service-provider-in-fact, then the Constitution’s demands should
apply to that service. This is so not merely because a member of the
public would reasonably observe the service to have been provided by
the municipality, though that is certainly the case. The municipality
in question, whether through its own service or by partnering with a
private ISP to provide service, enjoys the public interest-related
remunerations, as well as the political benefits, associated with highspeed Internet connectivity for its constituents. New York City and
its political leaders can tout the benefits of connecting Harlem to
WiFi, but along with those benefits should come the burdens of acting
consistently with the First Amendment when managing the
network—even if a private joint venture partner does the day-to-day
managing. Without entwinement between a private ISP and the
State, the Internet access provided by these networks would not exist
at all.
V. TERMS OF SERVICE AS SPEECH RULES AND THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
Like other ISPs, municipalities or their joint venture partners
regularly require that users assent to contractual terms-of-use-based
obligations as a precondition to network access. By defining what
speech can and cannot be transmitted over the network, and by
setting out the grounds by which the State can refuse a user access,
these terms define the contours of users’ First Amendment rights.
89. Buchanan, supra note 82, at 389–90 (discussing Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) and Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992)’s
implicit rejection of an exclusivity requirement under public function analysis); Id. at
422–23 (discussing a “returning willingness by the Court to consider the combined
weight of all state contact factors under state nexus analysis.”).
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For example, the city of Miami’s terms of use for its Miami Beach
WiFi network requires users to waive any claims against the City
based on service disruptions:
[Y]our access to the Service is completely at the discretion of the
City, and your access to the Service may be blocked, suspended, or
terminated at any time, at the sole discretion of the City, without
cause or for any reason including, but not limited to, any violation of
this Agreement, actions that may lead to liability for the City,
disruption of access to other Users or networks, and violation of
applicable laws or regulations . . . . Service is subject to
unavailability, including emergencies, third party service failures,
transmission, equipment or network problems or limitations,
interference, lack of signal strength, and maintenance and repair,
and may be interrupted, refused, limited, or curtailed at any time.90

Some terms of service for government-provided Internet access bar
outright certain constitutionally protected expression. For example,
the “Acceptable Use Policy” for the municipal utility-provided
Chattanooga fiber optic network bars users from using the network to
“transmit, distribute, or store material . . . that is,” in addition to
illegal, “obscene, threatening, abusive or hateful,” or that offends
“the privacy, publicity or other personal rights of others.”91 Nor may
users of the network “post messages” on third-party blogs “that are
excessive and/or intended to annoy or harass others”—“regardless of
[the] policies” of the blogs on which the users post.92 As in the Miami
terms of service, the utility operating of the Chattanooga network
also “reserves the right to reject or remove any material residing on
or transmitted to or through” the network that violates the
Acceptable Use Policy.93 The Terms and Conditions for GOWEX,
the private partner offering Internet access as part of the
aforementioned New York City Wireless Corridor Challenge, “bars
90. City of Miami Beach: WiFi Miami Beach—Network Terms and Conditions,
MIAMI BEACH, http://web.miamibeachfl.gov/wifi/scroll.aspx?id=53292 (last visited
Oct. 15, 2014) (emphasis added); see also City of Raleigh, North Carolina,
Downtown Raleigh Free WiFi Access Terms and Conditions (on file with author)
(“Under no circumstances shall the City, its officers, employees, or agents be liable
for any direct, indirect, incidental, special, punitive or consequential or other
damages that arise or result in any way from use of, or inability to use, the service to
or access to the Internet or any part thereof, or user’s reliance on, or use of,
information, services, or merchandise provided on or deletion of files, errors, defects,
delays in operation, or transmission, or any defect in or failure of performance.”).
91. See Acceptable Use Policy, ELECTRIC POWER BOARD CHATTANOOGA FIBER
OPTICS, https://epbfi.com/support/legal/acceptable-use-policy/ (last visited Oct. 15,
2014).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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the transmission of data . . . via Hotspots managed by
GOWEX . . . whose content is threatening, derogatory, obscene,
pornographic, or the transmission of any other type of material which
constitutes or incites a conduct which may be considered a criminal
offense, is prohibited.”94 GOWEX also “reserves the right to prevent
or block access to any user” who violates the content policy.95
This Article has argued that speech carried over a public network,
operated as either a municipally owned utility or via a partnership
with a private ISP, is protected by the First Amendment, and a
content-based interference with speech that is intended to be carried
over such a network is a prior restraint. First Amendment doctrine
also makes clear that outright bans on protected speech—even
indecent speech, let alone “excessive,” “derogatory,” “abusive,” or
“hateful” speech—are never narrowly tailored enough to survive
strict scrutiny.96 If those three premises are correct, it seems clear
that terms of service containing use proscriptions and waivers of the
type used by Miami, Chattanooga, and perhaps scores of other
municipalities, are impermissibly restricting carriage of a willing
user’s right to transmit protected speech over their networks.
As a general matter, “[g]ranting waivers to favored speakers
(or . . . denying them to disfavored speakers) would of course be
unconstitutional.”97 Similarly, a State’s conditioning the receipt of a
benefit on accepting a prior restraint on speech also offends the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. As Cass Sunstein has described
the doctrine, “government may not coerce people into relinquishing
constitutional rights through regulation, spending, and licensing, any
more than it may do so through criminal sanctions.”98 In these cases,
the relinquishment is of the First Amendment-derived right to
nondiscriminatory government treatment of speech, and the coercion
is the pre-requirement of waiver of the right to sue in exchange for

94. GOWEX Terms and Conditions for the New York City Wireless Corridor
Challenge (on file with author).
95. Id.
96. Sable Commc’ns. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126–28 (1989) (upholding
ban on obscene telephone messages, but finding ban on indecent messages not
narrowly tailored because indecent material generally receives full First Amendment
protection).
97. Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 325 (2002).
98. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an
Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70
B.U. L. REV. 593, 601 (1990); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)
(statement of the doctrine); Frost Trucking Co. et al., v. R.R. Comm’n of State of
Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926) (statement of the doctrine); Armijo, supra note 35, at
466.
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access to the network over which that speech will take place.
Moreover, governments conditioning Internet access on the waiver of
First Amendment rights cannot be heard to argue that prospective
speakers can simply exercise those rights using the networks of
private ISPs; the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is unconcerned
with “alternative settings” for the speech of the parties the
government seeks to coerce.99
Of course, the notion that one can waive at least some First
Amendment rights in exchange for a government benefit without
offending the Constitution is familiar in one particular context: public
employment. There, the Supreme Court seems to have little trouble
finding that the acceptance of the benefit validates the waiver. For
example, in Snepp v. United States,100 the Supreme Court upheld the
use of secrecy agreements to regulate the speech of CIA employees.
However, in that case the government did not seek waiver solely out
of an interest in censorship; rather, the CIA had particular national
security-related interests in preserving secrets to which current and
former CIA employees had access.101 By contrast, with respect to
government-provided broadband, there is no non-censorship-related
interest supporting the government’s desire to secure a First
Amendment waiver. In addition, the public employee cases take
pains to distinguish the government’s role as employer from the
government’s role as censor, a dichotomy not present in this
context.102
Accordingly, any terms of use utilized by a municipality for
governing access to its network, and in particular the network
operator’s ability to bar uses and users, must be limited to avoid this
constitutional problem. Any waiver from suit in the State’s terms of
use should be circumscribed to those content-neutral, technically
based disconnections associated with network management and
maintenance. If a municipality does choose to limit certain contentbased uses on its network, then those uses should be limited to the
few categories of unprotected speech that the government may
circumscribe because of its content, such as incitement, obscenity,
false advertising, and copyright infringement. One such example, to

99. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–83 (1972) (holding that a public
university’s decision to deny a student organization recognition burdened the group,
even though the group could associate with prospective members in other ways);
Autor v. Pritzker, 740 F.3d 176, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Healy).
100. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
101. Id. at 516.
102. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142–44 (1983).
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end this Article where we began, is in the terms of service for the
Harlem WiFi network. In those terms, Sky-Packets, the private ISP
and network manager, informs prospective users that:
[T]he Network is open to anyone, and individual activity and
content on the network is not limited, screened, or monitored. This
means that network users may access Internet sites that are harmful,
graphic, or offensive. The network does not filter or block any
sites. . . . Sky-Packets is not responsible for policing the Internet or
for an Internet user’s activity online [and] Sky-Packets upholds and
affirms the right of adults to have access to constitutionallyprotected materials and means of expression.103

CONCLUSION
As we have all learned over the past two years, the Internet has
boosted the power and efficiency of the government’s mass
surveillance apparatus such that any presumptions concerning the
privacy of online speech have been overwhelmed by the State’s
technological ability to monitor, amass, and crunch personal data.
Based on what we now know of the surveillance state, the question of
whether the government can collect information shared online is
moot; the debate has already turned to setting the proper limits on its
use of that information.104
In light of these sobering developments, one could easily conclude
that the last thing we should be doing is enabling or encouraging
governments to provide online networks for us to use for speech. We
have seen what the State has shown itself capable of and willing to do
in the surveillance context over private communications networks.
Based on that experience, it would be naïve at best to think it would
not bring those same attitudes to bear on monitoring and censoring
speech over its own networks, where its efforts would be far more
efficacious. In order to protect speech to the greatest degree possible,
the most speech-protective position might be for the State to stay out
of the speech carriage business altogether.
I am not so sure. Many governments have been unable to resist the
temptation to censor speech by exercising control over information

103. Harlem Outdoor WiFi Network Terms of Use (eff. December 2013) (on file
with author). The use of the term “adult” is not accidental; the Harlem WiFi Terms
of Use also state that the network “is intended for use by persons 18 years or older,
or with permission and supervision of a parent or guardian.” Id.
104. See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS.,
LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf.
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communications technology. It is thus dangerous to assume that
more digital speech will lead to a fuller marketplace of ideas, greater
self-fulfillment, and more informed political choices. However, it also
is difficult, as well as overly pessimistic, to conclude that technological
change necessarily comes at the expense of free speech.
The First Amendment is not self-enforcing. Well-crafted network
management principles can help ensure that speech carried via
government-provided ICT is adequately protected, so long as those
principles are (i) informed by traditional rules on content neutrality
and prior restraint, but also (ii) mindful of both technology’s
particular capacity to repress expression ex ante and the State’s
innate impulse to monitor, censor, or otherwise control the
dissemination of ideas. Critically, however, those rules should be in
place before the wires are laid and antennas are raised. If we design
and implement communications networks with the freedom of speech
in mind, we can be more confident that these new digital speech
spaces are actually the enablers of expression, galvanization,
interactivity, and change that we believe them to be.

